




Innovation under Merger 
Review and Abuse of 
Dominance: 
A Matter of Refurbishing Current 
Competition Law Concepts?
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Current approach focuses on services offered
Search engines:
analysis of market for online 





analysis of market for online 
advertising and potential
markets for communications
apps or social networks
Facebook/WhatsApp merger
Market for data?
Market definition requires existence of supply and
demand
In online platforms, data is usually
‘merely’ used as input
2014 Facebook/WhatsApp merger: parties not active in 
any markets for provision of data or data analytics
Definition of a potential market for data in 













• Dissenting statement FTC Commissioner Pamela 
Jones Harbour in Google/DoubleClick
• No full analysis of data-related competition
concerns in Google/DoubleClick and 
Facebook/WhatsApp
• Google/Nest merger in the US as an illustration
Abuse of dominance
• Using data to enter related markets and foreclose
competition in those markets
• In essential facilities cases existence of potential
or hypothetical market sufficient
Analogy with EU Horizontal Guidelines?
• Concept of ‘competition in innovation’
• Rely on R&D investments for assessing
competition concerns
• If precise R&D efforts are unobservable, identify 
‘specialised assets’ to which potential competitors 
need access
• Data as specialised asset?
Conclusion
There is a need to define a potential market for data 
even if it is not traded as a separate product
Ability but so far no willingness to go beyond
narrow relevant product markets
Protection of data-driven innovation requires more 
dynamic competition analysis
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